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SIMEON EBEN BALDWIN. By Frederick H. Jackson, with a foreword by
Charles E. Clark. New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University,
1955. Pp. xvi, 291. $5.00.
IT gives me special pleasure to review the biography of Simeon E. Baldwin
for the Yale Law Journal. This is chiefly because of the character of the man;
but it is also because of our long personal association and because of the debt
that this writer and the Yale Law School owe to him. In his foreword to the
volume, Judge Clark quotes from a tribute to Baldwin published in the Jolrnal
at the time of his death, and correctly attributes that quotation to me. Since
it is now nearly thirty years since those words were published, few of today's
readers of the Journal have seen them. They will bear repeating here:
"He was confident, definite and inflexible; and yet his modesty and sense
of proportion are strongly witnessed by his unswerving loyalty to this
law school, a loyalty expressed even in his last will and testament, in spite
of its departure from at least one of his long supported policies. Such a
man is the man to live with. He is the man whose memory will be kept
green; partly, indeed, because of his ideas and his unusual achievements,
but even more largely because of his life and character. The Yale Law
School will be proud to continue to build upon the broad and massive
foundations laid by this man throughout his long and noble life."'
Baldwin had reorganized this school after the Civil War, just thirty years
before my own entrance as one of his students in 1897. During those years
he was certainly the school's leading spirit; for a while he even carried its
financial responsibility. (In my first year as an instructor in 1903, my salary
checks were signed "Simeon E. Baldwin.") As a law student I was well aware
that he was my most effective instructor, especially when he was compelling
us to analyze and discuss the fifteen important cases that formed a part of his
material in the course on constitutional law. The weakness of his instruction
was that he gave us no opportunity to study the "wrong" decisions or to make
our own comparisons and form tentative, independent opinions. His lectures
were, in consequence, very formal and rather tedious. Neither he nor his
associates made me aware of the evolutionary development of law as a human
institution.
My personal acquaintance with Judge Baldwin (always known to me by
that title in spite of his two terms as Governor) lasted for another period of
nearly thirty years, 1897-1926. I never approached him personally as a student,
but it was he who wrote offering me a position as instructor. From 1903 to
1. Simeon E. Baldwin, 36 YALE L.J. 680, 682 (1927).
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1912, he attended faculty meetings, gradually taking a less active part in them.
During that period, the case method had been adopted in practically all courses,
even while he served on the Curriculum Committee. He was very considerate
of younger men and placed no obstacles in their way. After I discovered that
his eyesight was such that he could not easily recognize anyone on the street,
I took the initiative in speaking to him; in every case I was rewarded by a
cordial word and a brilliant smile. During my first year as instructor, he gave
a reception in his home in honor of Sir Frederick Pollock, who had delivered
the Storrs Lectures. I was greatly impressed by the skill that he displayed as
host, moving rapidly about making introductions, regrouping his guests and
stimulating conversation.
During the last thirteen years of his life, Baldwin took almost no part in the
affairs of the Law School. During that period, its character became greatly
changed. Its students were all college graduates and its faculty consisted almost
wholly of full-time teachers and research scholars. Yet the school's growth was
laid, as Professor Jackson's volume shows, upon foundations for which Bald-
win was largely responsible. He had organized post-graduate work leading to
advanced degrees; and he had listed in the catalogue many courses in eco-
nomics, history, political science and Roman law, given by men of the Univer-
sity faculty. These courses were never taken by many law students; but the
effects of uniting these subjects with the study of law were such that the entire
professional curriculum assumed a graduate character. The undergraduate law
school became a graduate law school.
In spite of my long contact with Baldwin and knowledge of his work as
teacher, writer, lawyer, judge, governor, and organizer of learned societies, I
found much in the present biography that was previously unknown to me. Of
course this is especially true of his earlier years, the details of which probably
will not greatly interest the general reader. Baldwin's career does not present
striking episodes that would arouse wide popular interest and acclaim. He did,
indeed, come to be regarded as "the first citizen of Connecticut," as his father,
grandfather and great-grandfather had been before him. His life and work
covered many fields, and he had influence in each of them: education, religion,
politics, history, law and other matters. But in none of them did he become a
national figure. After recounting all these varied and successful activities of
his subject, Professor Jackson says: "With all of these accomplishments to his
credit, it is somewhat perplexing to understand why, a generation after his
death, Simeon E. Baldwin is so little remembered. One explanation may be
that he dispersed his energies too widely, that he did not specialize in law or
history or international relations to a sufficient extent to become a truly great
figure."'2 With this the present reviewer agrees. The biographer adds that
there were unfortunate "breaks" that worked against his lasting fame; without
them he might have been a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
a United States Senator, the President of Yale, "or even the President of the
2. P. 213.
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United States."3 No doubt there is some truth in this estimate also. Lesser
men than Baldwin have occupied all these more glittering positions. Another
reason given is that "to the world he was austere and somewhat forbidding.
' 4
He did indeed seem so to me for a good many years.
Probably the best explanation is the last one given by Professor Jackson:
"Perhaps a final reason for the rapid decline of Baldwin's fame is his lack of
sympathy for many of the movements which were gaining success in his day."
Some of these "movements" took place in the major fields in which he played
a part: education, the judicial development of law, and government policy.
This lack of sympathy is illustrated by his controversy with Theodore Roose-
velt, arising out of a case in which Baldwin had decided that the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act was unconstitutional, 6 a decision later overruled by the
United States Supreme Court7 It is clear that Baldwin did not fully appreciate
the evolutionary process in the development of lav and social mores and the
part played therein by the judiciary. And his blindness was more than simple
dislike of some of the directions in which the evolutionary process was taking
us. There is no doubt that some of the developments that Baldwin disliked are
being discredited in the further process of evolution; but there is no reason to
expect that this will add anything to his fame or stature.
Still, the personality and the accomplishments of Simeon E. Baldwin were
such as to merit fully the present biography. It is brief, it is well-documented,
and it presents a true and interesting picture of an able, versatile and excep-
tionally honorable man.
ARTHUR L. CORBINt
CAPTAIN DREYFUS. By Nicholas Halasz. New York: Simon & Schuster,
1955. Pp. 268. $3.50.
IT was obviously more than accident that turned Nicholas Halasz' attention
to the Dreyfus case. This nineteenth century cause c~l~bre is a good detective
story, but more important it provides a compelling object lesson for our own
security-troubled times.
Alfred Dreyfus was a promising young member of the French general staff
in the mid-eighteen nineties, devoutly loyal to his nation and to the army which
was his life. He was also a Jew. In 1894, at a time when France was suffer-




6. Hoxie v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 82 Conn. 352, 73 At. 754 (1909). Baldwin
was a Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors from 1893 to 1907, and Chief
Justice from then until his retirement in 1910.
7. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
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counter intelligence staff discovered that the Germans had put their hands on
certain French military information. The French intercepted a message from
the German military attach6 in Paris to his Italian counterpart referring to a
"scoundrel D" as the source. They were baffled until a French agent, with
operatic audacity, walked into the German Embassy, snapped up the nearest
document and strolled off with it. By the purest chance this turned out to be a
handwritten but unsigned letter revealing that the writer was delivering certain
military information to the German military attach6. It was destined to become
world-famous as the Dreyfus bordereau.
The French officers concluded that the spy was a member of their general
staff. Assuming a connection between the purloined bordereau and the inter-
cepted message which events later contradicted, they ran through the list of
those on the staff whose names began with D. On the sole evidence of this
coincidence and of the bordereau, which did not identify him but which was
written in a hand that superficially resembled his own, Dreyfus was arrested
and bound over for court martial.
The prosecution relied largely on the bordereau in the open hearings. But
just before the members of the court martial retired for their deliberations, a
representative of General Mercier, Minister of War, casually handed one of
them a small package. It contained the intercepted message, a garbled but in-
criminating biography of Dreyfus and finally a statement to the court by Mer-
cier that the bordereau really had been written by Dreyfus. On this Dreyfus
was convicted and sent to Devil's Island in chains.
With Dreyfus safely away, the general staff breathed a sigh of relief: a scape-
goat had been found. Mercier ordered his incredible note to his inferiors on
the court martial destroyed, but it was not. An article in the press in 1896 re-
ported the use of the secret evidence and almost simultaneously Colonel Pic-
quart, new chief of the counter intelligence staff, discovered the real truth-
that the agent who wrote the bordereau was not Dreyfus but Esterhazy. Doubt
stirred up a movement for Dreyfus' retrial. In answer, the army tried and
acquitted Esterhazy and then arrested Colonel Picquart. The French intelli-
gence staff began to weave about itself a protective web of forgeries to im-
plicate both Dreyfus and Picquart, and the forces of nationalism, church, anti-
semitism and revanche united in agreement that retrial would be an insult to
the honor of the army and so to France. Meanwhile an innocent man re-
mained on Devil's Island.
Of the handful of Dreyfusards, some believed that Dreyfus was innocent.
Others, like Georges Clemenceau, originally believed in his guilt but were
shocked at the patent dishonesty of the procedure used to secure and uphold
the conviction. In their lonely alliance to force revision of the sentence they
emerged as true titans: Zola, whose J'Accuse invited and secured for him a
prosecution for criminal libel; Clemenceau, who wrote over 800 articles in re-
lentless attack on the judgment; the lawyers Demange and Reinach, who
sacrificed their practice for principle; and Scheurer-Kestner, who traded a
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great career in the Chamber of Deputies and his health for loyalty to the
Dreyfus cause.
It was Zola's article that turned the tide. It spread on the record the machi-
nations and intrigues that had created Dreyfus-the-traitor. It named the officers
of army intelligence and the general staff who knew the truth but were ready
to cheat and lie to keep it buried, the politicians who were prepared to stomach
the travesty of the Dreyfus trial for reasons of political expediency, and the
government's minions of easy conscience who could suppress or forge evidence
where the issue was the security of the state. Dreyfus was eventually par-
doned, cleared and reinstated in the army.
Halasz in his retelling of the great affaire scores on all counts. He balances
himself neatly between the facts and the drama. He follows the complicated
thread of the intrigue carefully and patiently. This is no simple hero-villain
yarn: too many participants played leading roles in the Dreyfus case to permit
black and white reproduction. Halasz gives each his due, and still finds time
and space for the flavor of political background. His book is popularized his-
tory at its best.
Halasz does not attempt, either in the text or in the preface, what must have
been a tempting exercise: to draw the analogies and comparisons between our
time and that. In some ways the similarities are strong. Dreyfus was un-
doubtedly innocent. He was convicted of a crime against the state on evidence
that any responsible prosecutor would be forced to admit was flimsy indeed;
evidence, moreover, that was submitted to the court martial in secret. The
accusation was justified, the result defended and the procedure excused on the
ground that it was better to sacrifice the man Dreyfus than to jeopardize the
god Security.
Ironically, too, the interests at stake were trivial. Esterhazy had sold secrets
of no military significance. The issue that wracked the army with dissension,
toppled ministries, inspired duels and paved the way for men on horseback to
ride to brief moments of glory had in reality nothing at all to do with the
security of France.
Furthermore, the plan came within an ace of succeeding because of a short-
lived but virulent attack of national insecurity. Part of France was so intent
on the wounds of the Franco-Prussian War and so fearful of more trouble with
its neighbor across the Rhine that it had little time for concern with individual
innocence, official honesty or effective and serious counter intelligence. The
Dreyfus case began as a spy trial, but it ended in a pitched battle to keep Drey-
fus in prison in spite of his admitted innocence; an expression of a deep
irrational desire to punish some individual for the fears and troubles of the
nation. France paid dearly for the harvest of cynicism, indignation and bitter-
ness that it reaped in these years.
So far this has a familiar ring. The Dreyfus case squarely raised the issue,
which this country is now facing, of the use of undisclosed evidence in pro-
ceedings involving the security of the state. It demonstrated, if ever demon-
stration were needed, the utter impossibility of reconciling such a practice with
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the concept of a fair and decent trial. But the game of analogies can be carried
too far. The Dreyfus case was the single episode of its time. France had sense
enough to expend its energies on one scapegoat. It did not put the machinery
of intrigue to work on a full-scale government loyalty project. Furthermore,
the French contented themselves with charging Dreyfus with an objective
offense: stealing documents. They did not strike on the happy idea of trying
his character. They asked the court martial the simple question, "Did he write
the bordereau ?"-and not "Would he ever, under any conceivable circum-
stances, have been capable of writing it or of associating with someone who
would, or capable of any other kind of disloyalty imaginable ?" (This, inciden-
tally, raises one of the great ironies of the case: Dreyfus would have been a
superb security risk. He was so apolitical he never fully understood the im-
plications of his experience. Had he been anyone but the victim of the affaire
he would not have been a Dreyfusard, according to Clemenceau.)
But it is the Dreyfusards themselves who really make the Dreyfus case
unique. The odds against them were enormous in 1894. The risks they ran
were serious to a degree that is difficult to appreciate now: one of the lawyers,
for instance, was shot and his brief case stolen as he was walking to the court.
Zola would have been lynched by the mobs outside had he not been acquitted
at his trial. Above all the story of the Dreyfus case is the story of their courage.
History will be hard pressed to nominate their equals in our own time.
WILLIAM D. ROGERS tJ
BAD HOUSEKEEPING; THE ADMIINSTRATIoN OF THE NEW YORK COURTS.
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1955. Pp. x, 159.
$1.00.
THIS attractive little booklet invites comment as to both its subject matter
and the circumstances that gave it birth. It comprises a report by a committee
of one of the leading bar associations of New York State, and indeed of the
country, based upon careful research into the operation of the extensive and
involved system of courts of that state. It comes at a crucial time when New
York is once again engaged in a study of its courts looking to the improvement
of the administration of justice. Judicial reform unfortunately does not generate
its own steam. Unless there is some outside stimulus, the ordinary political
forces of a state are not likely to produce changes of serious moment. So the
history of English judicial reform has been a long demonstration of the triumph
of lay pressure over the conservatism of both bench and bar.' And in the more
recent New Jersey reorganization, lay support proved invaluable. 2 But surely
Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. The classic account is Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform,
39 HARV. L. REv. 725 (1926) ; ef. CLARK, CoDE PLEADING 17-21. (2d ed. 1947).
2. See, e.g., Vanderbilt, Reorganication of the New Jersey Courts, 34 CHi. B. REc.
161 (1953).
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we are in an unfortunate pass if we must rely solely upon some nonprofessional
impetus for improvement in our courts. After all, both the professional skill
and the leadership of the lawyer are needed here perhaps more than in any
other area of social or governmental activity. It is heartening to see that bar
associations are more and more recognizing this responsibility and rising to
meet its challenge. This bar association is playing a notable part in the current
movement in New York; and it is significant that the first Director of Research
for this particular project, Mr. Leland L. Tolman, is now leaving the service
of federal court administration to become the Deputy Administrator of the
newly organized State Administrative Office for its busy Metropolitan area.
Here we find the Association's Special Committee on Studies and Surveys
of the Administration of Justice reporting on the administrative functioning
of the existing New York courts. Though at least eighteen "identifiable dif-
ferent kinds of courts" were discovered, this is not primarily a critique of or-
ganization or a plan for the integration of courts; nor is it a plea for better or
modem procedure in these courts. Those two major objectives of the usual
reform program were left for later development; indeed they are currently
under consideration by New York's Temporary Commission on the Courts.
What this report centers upon are the day-to-day activities of the courts. And
the picture it paints is one of disorganization, diversity, and overlapping or
conflicting personnel, with inexplicable variations in numbers, salaries and
duties. Such a state of affairs amply justifies the apt title, Bad Housekeepizg.
The report concludes with a recommendation for the establishment of a state-
wide judicial conference, with power to set up an administrative office with a
director, as well as departmental administrative committees. The Temporary
Commission made similar recommendations which have now been enacted into
law as a new article 7-A of the Judiciary Law entitled "Judicial Administra-
tion."3
Since this is a wholly admirable tract so far as it goes, it is perhaps un-
gracious to ask for more. Even a bar association must not get too far beyond
its constituency, and the least appreciation of the facts of judicial life must in-
clude the knowledge that the way of judicial reform is particularly hard in
New York, because of the strong political opposition it faces. It is not the
reviewer's intent to cavil at what we have; but it is necessary to point out the
limitations of the present study as we note the particularly perilous state of
worth-while reform in New York. This monograph does not undertake the
vital tasks of court integration and simplification of procedure. The reform of
the proposed judicial conference is proving altogether too limited, as the Presi-
dent of this Association has well pointed out.4 The latest development, as the
daily press discloses, is now a rather amazing opposition by the judges to real
3. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 869.
4. See MEDINA, THE NEw YoRK CoURTs, 1955 Homer S. Cummings Lecture, New
York University Law School; Karlen, Civil Remedies and Procedure, 1954 Survey of New
York Law, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1705, 1706 (1954). On the reform of procedure, see Clark,
A .llodern Procedure for New York, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1194 (1955).
[Vol. 65
REVIEWS
simplification of court structure--amazing even against the background of nor-
mal judicial conservatism. So we must say that this is an excellent job in an
important corner of court administration; but it is to be viewed as only a begin-
ning. "Manifestly judicial reform is no sport for the short-winded or for law-
yers who are afraid of temporary defeat."5
CHARLES E. CLARKt
THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF HAROLD J. LAsxi. By Herbert A. Deane. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1955. Pp. xiii, 370. $5.75.
I IusT begin in all candor by writing a personal confession which might well
be thought to put me out of court so far as this review is concerned. Some-
where about 1928 I was a member of an undergraduate society at Oxford
called, I believe, the Christ Church Essay Club. One evening the members
of this society were gratified to entertain a distinguished guest, Mr. Harold
Laski, then at the height of his fame at the London School of Economics. His
paper, as I well remember, was on the French revolutionary Franqois Noel
Babeuf, and his thesis-noted, I was amused to see, by Mr. Herbert Deane in
his scholarly book-was that the ideas of Babeuf had played a notable part in
forming the opinions, first of Karl Marx, and later of the Russian Communists.
This theory, intrinsically by no means implausible, was clinched in Laski's
paper by a personal anecdote so remarkable as to leave an indelible impression
on the mind of a youthful hearer. It seemed that Laski was sauntering down
Charing Cross Road one day when he fell upon an old edition of Babeuf's work
in the remainder shelf of a secondhand bookseller. As he idly turned the pages,
he noticed at once heavy underlinings and marginal comments in a handwriting
that seemed vaguely familiar. He purchased the volume and, hurrying back
home, was gratified but not altogether surprised to find that the marginal
comments were unmistakably in the handwriting of Karl Marx himself.
The incident made a considerable impression on me, and I had no particular
reason for doubting the facts until some years later, when Laski wrote in the
press accusing King George V of playing an unconstitutional part in the crisis
of 1931. This thesis, perfectly sustainable on theoretical grounds (though I
happen to disagree with it), was corroborated by the claim that one of Laski's
friends had access to the contents of a waste paper basket emanating from Buck-
ingham Palace. In the waste paper basket was, I think, a Daily Mirror, and,
believe it or not, the margin of that Daily Mirror contained a number of strongly
worded comments in a very well known handwriting indeed.
When I told the story in an Oxford senior common room a well known
professor cried out "Good God! The fellow has done the same thing to me."
At that moment I made a vow that I would never read another word written
5. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION XiX (1949).
tChief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
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by Laski, and I am happy to say that, puritanical as my attitude may now
seem, with very few exceptions I never have.
The result is that I am trebly disqualified from reviewing a work about
Harold Laski's political ideas. In the first place, I have probably read less of
Laski than almost any other contemporary writer. Secondly, I do not accept
the truth of any statement of fact contained in Laski's writings not independ-
ently corroborated, and this, I fear, makes it extremely difficult to evaluate
some of the judgments of fact contained in Mr. Deane's book, which assume
the truth of some of the statements of Laski-for instance, in his correspon-
dence with the late Justice Holmes. And finally, while as impressed as any-
one else with the extreme prolificacy of Laski's pen I have always refused
to take Laski seriously as a political writer. As a propagandist he was im-
pressive. As a teacher he had great ability, and rightly won the affection of
his pupils. But as a thinker, he was wanting in the necessary element of
intellectual integrity, and the inconsistencies which Deane exposes so merci-
lessly in his book are due to something less reputable than confusion of thought,
or the changes of opinion developing over a long period of time. Now, I am
quite sure that in the above judgment I shall seem biased and unfair, and from
one point of view in particular it is a judgment I particularly regret having
had to make. Harold Laski was a man of refinement and charm. \Vhen I met
him again more than twenty years after the meeting in those undergraduate
rooms in Christ Church, it was he, not I, who recalled the occasion, and he
somehow contrived to make me feel that his chance encounter with a strange
undergraduate of adverse political views had left a pleasing impression upon
his mind. If at any time I had been his pupil I know I should have fallen
under his spell like countless others, and despite his shortcomings I know I
should have held his memory-indeed as it is I hold his memory-in affection
and respect.
Yet it is impossible to assess his work, and equally impossible to review a
book devoted to it, without recognizing the ultimate moral and intellectual
weakness of its subject. His views on political theory changed not so much
because Laski had any objective reason founded on abstract thought to change
them, but because the political attitudes that he was making it his business to
justify or adopt had changed, and their defense required the background of a
different political theory to support them. The result is, as M\1r. Deane shows,
that there is absolutely nothing intelligible or consistent about Laski's political
thought viewed over a period of years. But one always knows which side he
is on.
For Laski was fundamentally less of a philosopher than a partisan, and less
of a theorist than an advocate. "I have," he wrote in 1939, "I suppose, been
a socialist in some degree ever since the last years of my schooldays."1 Now
it may be difficult to gather what, if anything, in the realm of theory remained




obscure what, if anything, he meant by socialism. But it is easy enough to see
at any moment where he stood politically. From first to last, Laski was the
partisan of the Labour movement in Great Britain, and, along with the Labour
movement, of certain causes and policies not universally assented to. The
constant support of a developing political movement on theoretical grounds
demands a certain freedom of maneuvre in political theory. This freedom
Laski expressed to a remarkable degree, and since his mental gyrations were
typical of those exhibited by a large minority of his British fellow countrymen,
less articulate, less sophisticated, and it must be added less talented, it is per-
haps worth-while to view his changes of front not as an essay in political
consistency, but as the reaction of a highly gifted political partisan to the
changing fortunes of British socialism. This truth is divined at least to some
extent by Mr. Deane, for he divides Laski's work into five periods, 1914-1924,
1925-1931, 1932-1939, 1940-1945 and 1946-1950, and each of these periods cor-
responds to a basic change in the fortunes and prospects of the party that Laski
supported.
Laski grew up in a dominant atmosphere of political Liberalism. The Liberal-
ism was decadent, but few recognized the symptoms of decay, and Laski was
not one of them. He saw the faults, the careerism, the materialist vulgarity
of Edwardian society. But he did not see how quickly it was to end. As a
socialist, he believed that the machinery of power was indefinitely beyond his
grasp, and since it seemed beyond his grasp he taught that it should be severely
limited in the scope of its operations. Odd as it now appears, the theory to
which Laski first gave expression was that of pluralism: the doctrine that
autonomous sources of power-in which, no doubt, he hoped that socialism
would thrive-must be developed outside the state. This pluralism, or "poly-
archism" as he called it, was characterized by functional decentralization and
delegation to local authorities, and buttressed by a theory of political obedience
dependent ultimately on the sanction of the individual conscience and under-
standing. These views, accompanied as they were by a theory of socialism based
almost entirely on a syndicalist view of collective action, and involving a con-
scious rejection of Marxism and what afterward became Leninism, exemplify
the classical recipe for the exponent of a political theory running counter to the
spirit of the age. Laski held them for just so long as the prospect of a socialist
electoral victory seemed remote.
For most British socialists, and in this respect Laski was typical, the triple
catastrophe of World War I, the Russian Revolution, and the postwar dis-
illusionment, operated as a watershed in political thought. Liberal society had
been shattered by the impact of war. The October Revolution disproved the
theory of the futility of violence. The postwar elections put the British Labour
Party, now riveted to socialism by a written constitution, firmly into the posi-
tion of the second of the two great parties of the State. It seemed only a matter
of time before a general election would yield a Labour Government with a full
majority, and if it did not, the general strike appeared to offer a successful
means of dispensing, if need be, with a majority at all.
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For this reason it was no longer necessary to believe that political power
was beyond the grasp of the socialist. On the other hand, the existing institu-
tions remained manifestly contrary to socialist demands. The question for the
British Labour Party was, therefore, whether the capture of political control
could be made to lead to a permanent and peaceful alteration in the organiza-
tion of society. Clearly on the basis of federalism and functional decentralization
the answer to this question was in the negative. A different and more authori-
tarian view of civil obligation was required, and Harold Laski was ready to
provide it. Unhappily there was a further complication. During the period
of Conservative rule Labour was largely of the opinion that a general strike
could be used as a weapon to achieve political power, and such a course would
run contrary to the theory of obligation which a socialist state would have to
impose and which even a democratic state must recognize if it is to survive.
It is therefore not surprising that during this.period Laski's main problem was
to marry the defense of collective disobedience to the affirmation of the political
authority that would have to be wielded by a socialist majority; and at the same
time to ridicule the theory of obligation on which the future of parliamentary
government depends. Thus the object of the state became unlimited, instead
of limited. It is "an organization for enabling the mass of men to realize social
good on the largest possible scale, ' 2 in which it is "obvious that the State can-
not risk" allowing the provision of essential goods by private enterprise.3 Never-
theless, in proportion as the state increases its claims, the more contingent
becomes our obligation to obey it. "Our obligation to obey the State is, law
apart, an obligation dependent on the degree to which the State achieves its
purpose. We are the judges of that achievement." 4 The result of such a double
view of the nature of the state and political obligation would obviously be an-
archy if it were not for the fact that it was also one-sided. But Laski saw no
reason why it should be otherwise, and was perfectly ready to condemn Con-
servative disobedience to a Labour Government even while supporting a gen-
eral strike against a Conservative Government.
Despite this inconsistency, Laski's thought during this period is on the whole
optimistic. Labour can look forward to electoral victories based on the vast
additions to the electorate in 1918 and 1925. These victories will enable the
theory of socialism to be translated into legislative effect. The possibility
that the mass electorate will turn decisively away from the Labour Party in
moments of grave economic crisis has not yet occurred to Laski. Capitalism
can be held in check, or possibly even overthrown, in periods of Conservative
rule by the threat of a general strike. If it is not overthrown the masses will
realize in the end the power of the ballot box, and vote in the one manner
that their class interest will dictate. For that moment Labour can, in the






Laski never gives a coherent or intelligible answer to the question what
kind of millenium it is waiting for.
The economic crisis of 1930-1931, and the election of 1931, came to Laski as
blows between the eyes. Labour was decisively defeated by the very votes
on which it had counted for success; and at the very moment when orthodox
socialism would have supposed that the suffering of the masses might drive
them to adopt a revolutionary policy, the people seemed never less inclined
to extra-constitutional procedures. The calamity of the economic crisis, and
popular rejection, led to the most disastrous and least reputable period of Laski's
thinking.
It was, of course, unthinkable either that the catastrophe was contributed
to by any deficiency in the Labour Government's policy, or even that it was
part of a world crisis beyond the control of any British Administration. It was,
Laski proclaimed, and as the Labour Party has asserted to this day, the product
of a conspiracy. His view of the crisis and its outcome was, in brief, that
democracy was a sham, that "finance-capital will not permit the ordinary
assumptions of the Constitution to work if these operate to its disadvantage.
Socialistic measures, in a word, are not obtainable by constitutional means," 5
and "if Socialists wish to secure a State built upon the principles of their faith,
they can only do so by revolutionary means." 6 The new Cabinet was in fact
"born of a palace revolution ' 7 and in England for the first time since the seven-
teenth century "what was coming rapidly into the foreground of discussion
was the very thesis of Parliamentary Government itself."
Unhappily this period coincided with the rise of Fascism on the European
Continent, and the results of Laski's thinking were disastrous. Mr. Deane
considers, with some reason, that they may even have had some influence on
the morbid state of public opinion which led indirectly to British unprepared-
ness at the beginning of World War II. Laski's disillusionment with democracy
was so thoroughgoing as to lead him on the whole to accept the general Marxist
theory of the state from which he had thitherto stood aloof. Democracy be-
comes "capitalist democracy." The state exists to protect the vested interests
in the class relations in the particular society. The judiciary itself is suspect,
"for the Courts are part of the coercive machinery of the State, [and] must
protect as fully as possible the interests of those who own the means of pro-
duction." 9 It was, in fact, the acceptance of this theory of politics at the time
by the Labour Party, largely under the influence of Laski, that drove public
opinion into two widely divergent camps, each unable to combine with the
other in defense of its own values. When such a view was accepted it followed
that the Labour Part, was thought to have more in common with the Russian
Communists than with its Conservative fellow countrymen, whilst those same
5. P. 146.
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Conservative opponents were thought to differ from Fascists only in degree
and not in kind. The defense of democracy as such was largely allowed
to go by default by the members of left wing circles, who showed them-
selves more concerned to establish than to prevent a connection between Con-
servatives (who were themselves, as the event proved, no less warmly attached
to Britain's democratic constitution) and the Fascist powers; and keener on
the hopeless fortunes of the Spanish Republicans than on the obvious necessity
of military preparation at home. In the meantime the ultimate aims of the
Labour Party could, it was constantly being urged, only be bought at the price,
if not of revolution, at least of the establishment of some form of dictatorship.
Mr. Deane puts the point very well:
"The Laski-Marxist onslaught on 'capitalist democracy' was a pure gift
to the Nazi propagandists who were endeavoring to exploit group differ-
ences within the democracies, and in particular, to convince the workers
that their real enemies were the 'plutocrats' who dominated English and
French society. It is understandable that many workers, when faced
with the choice between Fascism as the overt rule of the privileged class,
and 'capitalist democracy' as a more subtle form of capitalist domination,
lapsed into the mood of cynical apathy or 'revolutionary defeatism' so
evident in France in 1939. The attacks on the 'bourgeois' governments of
England and France and the insistence that the interests of the rulers
and those of the masses were completely contradictory constituted serious
obstacles to the effective rearmament that was imperative if the threat
of Fascist aggression was to be met. Although Laski, like many other Left-
wing leaders, was clearly anti-Fascist, he continued until 1937 at least, to
oppose any serious effort to rearm. Finally, by reducing the alternatives of
political action to two polar opposites, Fascism and revolutionary socialism,
Laski and his followers frightened off conservative and liberal groups and so
lessened the chances for a strong anti-Fascist coalition with each of the
democracies."'1
The cynicism and pessimism that underlay almost all Labour socialist thought
at this period led Laski, at once its victim and its nurse, both to belittle the
work of men like Keynes, Salter or Beveridge in Britain, or Roosevelt on the
other side of the Atlantic, and to minimize the weaknesses of the Bolshevist
experiment in Russia, and of the Marxist theory upon which that experiment
was based:
"No tool at the command of the social philosopher surpasses Marxism
either in its power to explain the movement of ideas or its authority to
predict their practical outcome. . . . On the breakdown of capitalist de-
mocracy, the decline of bourgeois culture, the rise of Fascism, the role
of non-revolutionary socialism, it has insights not possessed by any alter-
native method of analysis.""
It is true that he continued to advocate the use of constitutional opportunities





"the inexorable faith of Lenin in the coming of our opportunity, his un-
resting preparation to be fit for the hour when it came. British Socialism
has passed the stage when it can indulge in the carefree dreams of youth.
The time has come when it should assume the intellectual responsibilities
of manhood .... I wish my own party could command the same fervent
and selfless devotion from its members [as the Russian Communist
Party]."12
Against this background it is fair to recall that later, during the crisis of
1940, Laski worked with his customary tireless zeal to promote an Allied
victory, and between 1940 and the end of 1942 he was a loyal and stalwart
champion of the coalition. His attitude during the latter part of the war was,
however, less creditable and less intelligent, for he attempted to persuade the
leaders of his party to break the coalition unless the Conservative ministers
agreed to start the movement of socialism before the achievement of victory.
As the immediate prospect of a Nazi victory began to fade, the old dogmas
began to reemerge from their hiding places, and Laski began to preach that
if returned at the election anticipated after the end of hostilities, the Labour
movement should adopt some of the methods of a dictatorship by packing the
civil service and the courts, corrupting the armed forces, and even, if necessary,
persecuting Conservative political ideas. It was this period of wild theorizing,
based upon a complete misapprehension of the national mood and, it is fair
to add, of the Labour Party itself, that led Mr. Attlee in the hour of victory
to recommend for Laski a period of silence as beneficial to all concerned. It is
perhaps not unfair to say that even from the practical point of view, if any-
thing could have prevented the Labour victory at the polls in 1945, it would
have been the policy recommended to the Party by Harold Laski.
Laski lived for four years under the Socialist Government he had striven so
long to achieve. For Laski, however, they were years of judgment rather
than triumph. During this period he survived to see almost every prediction
he had made prove false in the event. The new Labour victory was based upon
a massive movement of public opinion, as heavy, and perhaps as excessive, as
that which had destroyed the second Labour Government in 1931. There was
no attempt by finance capital within or without the country to defeat the
prospects of the Socialist Administration. The Conservative Party was content
to recreate itself by patient work in the House of Commons and in the constitu-
encies, and to plan a constitutional reversal by political means. Socialist Britain
was buoyed and protected from the consequences of transition to a peace economy
by the farsighted policies of Capitalist America. There never was any prospect
of a wholesale repeal of socialist measures by a resurgent Conservatism. Nor
has there been evinced any permanent enthusiasm for the socialist conception
of society by the pragmatic British electorate.
Worst of all, Socialist Russia proved the implacable foe, as Capitalist
America had proved the indispensable friend, of Britain and the Labour
Government. Laski lived to see the beginning of the cold war, but
12. P. 218.
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was unable to appreciate its implications. Characteristically, he blamed both
West and East in equal shares. His intellectual commitment to the East pre-
vented him from placing the blame where it belonged. But his basic loyalty
to his country and to his party prevented him from exonerating the East
from all blame.
At the end of his book Mr. Deane is driven to conclude that Laski was a
failure. He had never achieved the distinction as a political theorist or as a
scholar that his early works had promised. His failure was in fact brought
about by the defect of his character to which I adverted at the beginning.
As Mr. Deane puts it:
"The power of his emotions and his sympathies was not matched by his
intellectual depth and acuity. As a consquence his statements and judg-
ments were often irresponsible, and he was led to ignore the moral de-
mands imposed upon the serious writer."' 3
At the same time it is fair to Laski to remind the reader that Laski's failure
was, to some extent at least, the failure of his age and generation, and to an
even greater extent was due to the ultimate intellectual sterility of the British
left wing within that generation. Despite his fecundity of expression, Laski
was ultimately devoid of any original ideas about the presuppositions which
alone give meaning to political, or any other, abstract thought. Although
brought up in an orthodox Jewish family, he had no fundamental metaphysical
beliefs of any kind. Had he been a thoroughgoing materialist he would, I think,
inevitably have drifted into the Communist canp. But he was far too refined
and civilized a personality to be a thoroughgoing materialist, and too much the
child of his age to feel the want of any other philosophy not materialistic in
conception, or to appreciate the relevance of such a philosophy to political
ideas. He had no theory of mankind, and no objective criteria to enable him
to evaluate the varying aspirations of the human heart. He had no abstract
conception of justice, nor any belief in a natural law-nothing to protect him
from the dreadful alternation between individualism and tyranny, nothing to
provide a nonmaterial standard whereby to set a bound to liberty, or a re-
straint upon the exercise of power. He was too Jewish to accept the pragmatic
limitations of the British Labour Party, too English to adopt wholeheartedly
instead a consistent intellectual theory of politics. So while he had the instincts
and many of the gifts of a prophet, he drifted through life with the limitations
of an advocate in a sphere where mere advocacy is scarcely respectable. That
in the course of this life he managed to win and charm a host of those who
did not admire his achievements or accept his opinions, is rather a tribute to
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